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Abstract 
Ethnic conflicts remain the biggest setback to the development of many African nations today, Kenya included. 
This study analysed the emerging trends and reasons for the persistence of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya. It was 
undertaken in the context of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) and was done in inter-ethnic prone 
Counties in Kenya including Nakuru, Eldoret, Laikipia and Mombasa. The study population was 1,624,345 
PCEA members drawn from Nakuru west, Nakuru East, Njoro, Elburgon, Laikipia, Eldoret and Mombasa 
Presbyteries which are perceived as inter-ethnic conflicts dominant. A sample size of 384 respondents obtained 
through random sampling was selected from the presbyteries in the study locale. The study adopted a descriptive 
survey research design employing mixed methods of data collection. The instruments for data collection were 
questionnaires for the Church elders and members, structured interview guide for Church ministers and Focus 
Group Discussions (FGDs) for victims. The study established that the major reasons for the persistence of inter-
ethnic conflicts in Kenya are radicalization, economic imperialism, elite manipulation, deep-rooted cultural 
practices and language prejudices.  These are the vices that must be eradicated if at all the inter-ethnic conflicts 
which have been the major hiccups to the socio-political and economic development of Kenya will be effectively 
addressed.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War in 1980s, the world has witnessed an increasing number of inter-ethnic conflicts. 
In Africa, ethnic conflict is inherently a problem that requires effective peace building strategies to ensure ethnic 
tolerance and cohesion (Lynch, 2011). In Kenya, there has been a marked increase in ethnic conflicts in the 
recent times (Onyebadi & Oyedeji, 2011). Since independence, Kenyan politics have been guided by ethnic 
politicking and competition, hence ethnic conflicts in 1992, 2002 and climaxed by the grave 2007/08 post-
election violence which had a repugnant effect on this country. The conflicts in Kenya are multiple and 
overlapping resulting from a range of factors including ethnic intolerance; historical injustices; border conflicts; 
ethno-regionalist sentiments and political party zoning; radicalisation; competition over land and other resources; 
proliferation of small arms; weak security; poverty, underdevelopment, and marginalisation. Inter-communal 
violence risks being increased by competition over the fruits of devolution and elite manipulation of local 
communities (Ombaka, 2015; Dowd & Raleigh, 2013; Halakhe, 2013; Sharamo, 2014; Boone, 2011). 
 
It cannot be overemphasized that conflicts are the major hiccups to the development of Kenya and the rest of 
African countries since independence (Kagema, 2015, and any effort to develop Africa must aim at their 
eradication.   This study employed the Liberal Peace Theory advanced by Lederach (1997), which advocates that 
the concept of peace building and reconciliation is understood as a process that takes place along approaches of 
conflict resolution. This is in line with Wafula (2014)’s view that reconciliation is a condition that goes beyond 
the conflict. Notably, the approach adopted in this study focuses on reconciliation as the last challenge to reach 
in order to sort out a conflict. As long as you have people previously confronted not reconciled, the conflict is 
still there and the violence is likely to flourish anytime. Liberal peace theory thus underscores that reconciliation 
is fundamental in conflictive contexts in order to get people living together in long term peace. Lederach (1997) 
lauds the expansion of conflict resolution to include alternative dispute resolution, mediation, conciliation, 
violence prevention, early warning systems, community reconciliation, nonviolent peacekeeping, trauma healing, 
second-track diplomacy, and problem-solving workshops. 
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2. Methodology 
This study adopted the descriptive survey research method employing a mixture of qualitative and quantitative 
methods in many phases in the research process. It was conducted using a qualitative, phenomenological in-
depth interview and conduct Focus Group Discussions to examine the dynamics of inter-ethnic conflicts in 
Kenya and reasons for the persistence of the inter-ethnic conflicts in this country. It was undertaken in the 
context of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) which Kagema (2012) informs that is among the 
fastest growing Churches in Kenya.   Seven selected PCEA presbyteries located in Counties where inter-ethnic 
conflicts have been reported dominant namely Nakuru west, Nakuru East, Njoro, Elburgon, Eldoret, Laikipia and 
Mombasa were purposely selected for this study.  
 
The target population was 1,624,345 PCEA members from the presbyteries chosen for this study namely Nakuru 
West, Nakuru East, Njoro, Elburgon, Eldoret, Laikipia and Pwani comprising of 103 ministers, 1620 church 
elders and 1, 622,622 Ordinary church members. The presbyteries were chosen because they are located in the 
conflict prone Counties namely Nakuru, Eldoret, Laikipia and Mombasa. This is reflected in Makori (2011)’s  
Report on Ethnic Conflict and National Security in Kenya, which showed that  that Nakuru, Eldoret, Laikipia 
and Mombasa are the worst hit Counties by conflicts in Kenya.   Table 1 below shows the distribution of the 
presbyteries in the study locale and their population according to Church records of the year 2018. Using Kathuri 
and Pals (1993)’s table, 384 respondents were selected for this study. Out of the 384 respondents, there were 7 
Church ministers, 38 Church elders and 342 Church members who were affected by ethnic the conflicts. Simple 
Random Sampling was employed to identify the respondents.  
 
Table 1 
Distribution of the Study Population 
Presbytery Population of 
Church Ministers 
Population of 
Church Elders 
Population of 
Church members 
Total 
Nakuru West 15 272 607000 607287 
Nakuru East 19 284 636000 636303 
Elburgon 10 202 155000 155212 
Njoro 13 242 202000 202255 
Eldoret 10 150 3770 3930 
Laikipia 26 290 9011 9327 
Pwani 10 180 9841 10031 
Total 103 1620 1,622622 1624345 
Source: PCEA Records, 2018 
 
3. Findings 
3.1 Reasons for Persistence of Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in Kenya 
38 PCEA elders and 342 ordinary church members provided with reasons they perceived as the cause of the 
persistence of ethnic conflicts in Kenya.  Using a likert scale, they were required to indicate level of agreement 
with the reasons that were suggested by the researchers. The responses were measured on a five-point Likert 
rating scale provided, including ‘strongly agree’ (scored 5), ‘agree’ (scored 4), ‘neutral’ or ‘non-committal’ 
(scored 3), ‘disagree’ (scored 2) and ‘strongly disagree’ (scored 1).  
 
This section presents the available quantitative data which provides an overview of reasons for the trends in the 
persistence of inter-ethnic conflict in Kenya. This is followed by detailed information on some of the specific 
reasons which the study participants saw as important, their dynamics and specific contributory factors as 
revealed by the qualitative component of the research and supplemented by secondary data. The quantitative data 
obtained from questionnaires is captured in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2. 
Reasons for the  Persistence of Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Kenya  
 
Reasons for Persistence of Inter-Ethnic 
Conflict in Kenya 
Responses (n = 350)  
SA A N D SD Mean 
Radicalization 190(54) 122(35)   22(6) 4(1) 12(3) 4.35 
Economic imperialism 204(58) 94(27) 12(3) 16(5) 24(6) 4.25 
Exclusion and marginalization 188(54) 92(26) 14(4) 29(8)  27(8) 4.10 
Elite manipulation 192(55) 122(35) 11(31) 9(3) 34(10) 4.38 
Deep rooted cultural practices  178(51) 132(38) 3(1) 24(7) 13(4) 4.25 
Language prejudice 154(44) 104(3) 26(7) 51(1) 15(4) 3.94 
 
From the results in Table 2, it is evident that economic imperialism (58%), exclusion and elite manipulation (55%), 
radicalization (54%), Exclusion and marginalization (54%), deep rooted cultural practices and stereotypes (51%) 
and language prejudice (44%) are main reasons for the persistence of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya. This implies 
that the majority of the Church elders and ordinary Church members see economic subjugation as the main reason 
for the persistence of inter-ethnic conflict in Kenya followed by elite manipulation, youth radicalization, exclusion 
and marginalization, deep-rooted cultural practices and finally language prejudices among others.   
These are elaborated below. 
 
3.1.1 Economic Imperialism 
Findings of this study indicate that the majority of Church members generally agree that economic imperialism 
is one of the main reasons for the persistence of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya (This because 204(58%) of the 
church members ‘strongly agreed’ and 94(27%) ‘agreed, indicating that 85% saw economic imperialism as the 
real issue ’).  According to Mwadoe (2018), at the Kenyan coast, in Pwani presbytery, the indigenous groups 
complain of domination by "upcountry" communities in terms of economic opportunities. Indeed, such 
sentiments have often taken the form of calls for a neo-federal system of government at the Coast. Juma (2018) 
supported the views of Mwadoe by saying that Coast residents felt that all resources are concentrated upcountry 
and ‘Pwani’ or Coast is just a conduit.  
 
This kind of scenario was confirmed in the Presbyteries. Following the interviews with 4 Church ministers and 
FGDs with 77 victims of inter-ethnic conflict comprising of 17 members in each group in Nakuru Presbytery and 
60 in Eldoret Presbytery, the main contention is between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin communities, where each 
community feels that the other denies it an opportunity to enjoy the county’s economic benefits. According to 
the FGD conducted in Eldoret, the Kalenjins perceive the Kikuyu as crafty and opportunistic since they 
gradually occupied their land, established businesses and overpowered themselves economically in their own 
soil. Since the Kalenjins have been majorly pastoralists, they feel that the Kikuyus, mainly farmers, cheated them 
by buying their large tracts of productive land very cheaply and thus became too powerful economically 
(Kinyua, 2018). Therefore, the Kalenjins after realizing the value of land economically, have decided to fight 
“for their right”, hence the persistence of conflicts despite many interventions. Thus issues such as corruption, 
poverty, inequality, Majimbo and economic growth have been reduced to a contest of ethnicities. For example, 
Corruption has been reduced into a “Kikuyu problem” where the Kikuyus are generally viewed as corrupt 
people. They are also viewed as the ones propagating ‘inequality’. The reaction to this is ‘Majimbo’ where the 
Kalenjins have organized themselves so as reclaim their land (Cherono, 2018). This has been a source of conflict 
between these two communities living in Rift Valley (Kinyua, 2018).   The responses of one of the respondents 
from Eldoret Presbytery can help us understand well how the situation is. She says that, 
 
“The Kikuyus think that the Kalenjins are too foolish and therefore do not know the value of land and, that is 
why they treat them as half-citizens.  The enlightenment of the Kalenjins is the main reason for the persistence of 
conflicts between these two communities”. 
 
From the FGDs carried out in Nakuru Presbytery, which is predominantly Kikuyu, the Kikuyu respondents 
regarded the Kalenjins as ‘lazy and non-industrious’. According to them, the conflicts arise and persist because 
the Kalenjins are jealous due to the progress of the Kikuyus.  For example Maina (2018) argued that the 
Kalenjins envy the Kikuyus’ property not realizing that they get such wealth though hard work and resilience. 
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This clearly shows that as far as some Kenyans are thinking like this we have a real problem. The government, 
religious organizations and other stakeholders have a hefty task if they will deal with this problem of inter-ethnic 
conflicts which continue to derail the development of this country and Africa as a whole. There will be need to 
change the attitude of communities towards each other so that they live in harmony. It is an issue that must be 
tackled properly. 345 (89.8%) of the respondents were of the view that the economic empowerment of the 
citizens by the County and National governments would play a great role in reconciling the infighting 
communities. 
 
3.1.2 Manipulation by the Elite 
 192(55%) respondents strongly agreed, and 122(35%) agreed that elite manipulation was responsible for inter-
ethnic conflicts in Kenya. Thus 90% of Church members saw it as a real issue.  Focus Groups identified 
significant levels of elite manipulation of ethnic ideology for political survival in the advent of devolution. This 
means that elite manipulation emerged as one of the main reason for the persistence of inter-ethnic conflicts in 
Kenya. There is a general feeling that the elite minority are the ones who control power, wealth and influence. 
 
A similar finding was reported by Sehrawat and Sharma (2018) who posit that the state is seen as a possession of 
the ruling elite while at the same time alienating those who do not belong to the ruling political parties and 
affiliated ethnicities. In the same breadth, Botha (2014) provides the argument that political entrepreneurs use 
ethnic affiliation and manipulate ethnic grievances as the basis for political mobilisation.  Mbugua and Rwanda 
(2018) support this view by asserting that a significant number of youth from certain tribes feel alienated from 
the national and county government employments thus show growing animosity towards them, largely because 
the political elites in government undermine the rule of law, making youth more vulnerable to underemployment. 
Similar assertions were generated in an exclusive interview with Reverend Kimani (2018), the Minister of PCEA 
St. Ninian’s, Nakuru who held the view that political elites incite ethnic violence for political gain.  
 
 Mbugua (2013) avers that the incentives for inter-ethnic conflict in terms of political gains are stronger than 
those for peace. The conflict is said to operate in a way that constantly undermines any positive institutional 
initiative that may try to amend the system or ameliorate the problem. Recent attempts to mitigate the use of 
‘negative ethnicity’ by political elites through robust state and electoral institutions and trying to foster the 
emergence of cross-cutting issue based political coalitions have not succeeded in changing the status quo of 
ethnic politics. Thus, the role of political elite’ in instigating inter-ethnic conflicts has increasingly come under 
scrutiny as an emerging trend. Mumbi (2013) found that the Kenyan political elites have over time 
institutionalized ethnic politics and have used simmering ethnic grievances relating to land and exclusion to 
instigate ethnic-based electoral violence.  
 
The role of elite pacts has been cited as a major determinant of political stability in a country, particularly a 
democratizing one (Guarnizo, Portes& Haller, 2003). On why some African countries have remained politically 
stable while others have been plagued by civil wars, Lindeman (2008) argues that the key causal factor is 
whether inclusive or exclusive elite bargains (pacts) are part of the political process. In other words, the levelling 
of inter-elite inequalities reduces the incentives for excluded political elites to instigate violent conflict. A similar 
view point is expressed by Orji (2010) who compared the 2007 elections in Nigeria and Kenya. Orji argues that 
the reason for the peaceful elections in Nigeria versus the violence in Kenya has been the informal power-
sharing agreement between the country’s ethno-regional elites. Regardless of their origins, it is clear that 
economic discrimination has been a pathway manipulated by the political elites in Kenya. Therefore, the more 
intense and prevalent the economic discrimination and community balkanization of communities along these 
lines are, the more likely that affected groups will be mobilized to resist the demands. The resultant dispute is 
very likely to take on an ethnic dimension.  This brings to the fore that if the issue of political elite manipulation 
of their co-ethnics remain unaddressed, historical narratives and grievances will continue to prevent social 
cohesion among communities in Kenya. 
 
3.1.3 Radicalization 
 190(54%) of the respondents strongly agreed and 122(35%) agreed that radicalization especially for the youth in 
Pwani presbytery has exacerbated the problem of inter-ethnics conflict in the region. This implies that 89% of the 
citizens feel that in the coastal region of Kenya, conflicts are largely due to youth radicalization.   
 
There are dramatic regional variations in the types, tactics and perpetrators of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya. The 
nature and extent of crime and violence in the country varies according to the setting, that is, urban or rural, and the 
prevailing conditions of an area. The information gained was maximized by the use of key informant interviews and 
FGDs with respondents expected to have a broad or specific understanding of the dynamics (context and reasons for 
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persistence) of inter-ethnic conflict in Kenya. In Pwani Presbytery, 2 clergymen interviewed and 1 FGD comprising 
of 11 Church members of inter-ethnic conflict indicated that youth radicalization was an emerging trend responsible 
for persistence inter-ethnic conflicts in the region. This is in tandem with Dowd and Raleigh (2013) findings that 
youth radicalization has tended to be clustered in the North Eastern regions which borders Somalia, the Coast area 
in the south-east, and Nairobi. 
 
Sentiments derived from 11 victims of inter-ethnic conflict in Pwani presbytery who participated in FGD indicated 
that the history of youth radicalization into violence or radicalization leading to terrorism is quite contemporary and 
a complex psychosocial process. In trying to further espouse the issue, Munyoroku (2018) identified a number of 
factors responsible for the rise in violent extremism in Kenya, including the spill over of ideology, fighters and 
resources from Al-Shabaab’s occupation of Somalia, external actors who have exploited the instability in the porous 
coastal region (such as Salafi ideology and links with the Arab world), a burgeoning Muslim youth population, 
socio-economic disparities and lack of political representation  as the main factors leading to radicalization.  
 
In a similar vein, the results obtained from the FGD comprising of 11members who were victims carried out in 
Pwani presbytery on the 27th day of October, 2018 at PCEA St. Margaret Church revealed that there were cross-
cutting drivers of inter-ethnic conflicts mentioned repeatedly which included radicalization mainly caused by 
religious intolerance or indoctrination perpetuated mainly through ‘Madrasas.  
 
In support of Munyoroku and the sentiments of FGD, Mwandoe (2018) said that in Pwani Presbytery, the failure 
to address persistent land issues, engage with moderate local leaders and to establish the county government as a 
legitimate authority could be fuelling interreligious tensions, extremism and inter-ethnic conflict gravitated by 
the emerging trends of radicalization. In an exclusive interview, Mwandoe (2018) highlighted that over the last 
decade since 2010 many young men in Pwani presbytery have received training after being recruited by radical 
preachers to fight in Somalia for the Al-Shabaab. Mwandoe (2018) adds that when such youth return home, 
some of them still see themselves as pursuing Jihad, while others are disillusioned by the experience in Somalia. 
Mwandoe (2018) further posits that the majority of the youth especially the Muslims in the coastal region are 
increasingly vulnerable to radicalization efforts, which liken their ethnic, racial, and religious marginalization to 
the systematic discrimination of all Muslims worldwide.  
 
This discourse has increasingly appealed to Kenyan Muslims in the Coast effectively expanding Al-Shabaab’s 
recruitment beyond Somali borders. These findings indicate that inter-ethnic conflicts especially in the Kenyan 
Coast is as a result of youth radicalization rooted in religious intolerance or indoctrination perpetuated mainly 
through ‘Madrasas’ and the spillover of Al-Shabaab’s ideology.   
 
3.1.4 Social Exclusion and Marginalization 
Exclusion and marginalization were cited as the other the main reasons for the persistence of inter-ethnic 
conflicts in Kenya. Of the respondents that took part in this study, 188(54%) strongly agreed, while 92(26%) 
agreed that inter-ethnic conflicts that sporadically flare-up in Kenya were as a result of exclusion and 
marginalization. A Focus Group Discussion involving 17 people conducted at PCEA Saint Margaret Church in 
Pwani Presbytery revealed the history of exclusion and marginalization of coastal people.  Goldsmith (2009) 
describes it as the “crisis of second-class citizenship”, where the mixed-heritage Swahili are largely peripheral in 
post-independence Kenya. 
 
The Coastal residents, according to the FGD members who took part in the survey, felt that exclusion and 
marginalization compelled them to the point of feeling that they were not Kenyans. Hence the slogan ‘Pwani si 
Kenya’ (Coast is not Kenya) based on secessionist tendencies. According to Nthambiri (2018), the Coast region 
has a long history of calling for secession from Kenya based on distinct ethno-regional identities and claims of 
socio-economic marginalisation of the region. These claims of socio-economic marginalisation are of particular 
concern where they overlap with religious narratives used by the Muslim militants in the volatile regions.  
 
On his part Munyoroku (2018), posits that the violence in the Coast is characterised by ‘relatively high volatility, 
reflected in sporadic spikes in violence, followed by relative lulls’. He asserts that until recently, street protests 
were the most common form of political action at the coast. Since 2008, the Mombasa Republican Council has 
regained momentum in its calls for secession, with a focus on land issues and economic frustration. Muthomi 
(2018) opines that people living in individual competitive conditions perceive ethnic out-groups as a threat, and 
that this in turn reinforces ethnic exclusionism. Contextual competitive conditions, particularly the presence of 
non-coastal citizens, also affect ethnic exclusionism. Muthomi (2018) further observes that there are close links 
between social exclusion and violent conflict and insecurity, both in terms of causes and consequences. There 
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are now convincing arguments that some forms of social exclusion generate the conditions in which conflict can 
arise.  This can range from civil unrest to violent armed conflict and terrorist activity. Severely disadvantaged 
groups with shared characteristics (such as ethnicity or religion) may resort to violent conflicts in order to claim 
their rights and redress inequalities. Group differences are not enough in themselves to cause conflict, but social 
exclusion and horizontal inequalities provide fertile ground for violent mobilization as has happened in the 
Kenyan Coast.  
By analyzing why some societies with sharp horizontal inequalities suffer conflict and others do not, it became 
evident from the FGDs that conflict occurs most frequently when socio-economic and political horizontal 
inequalities are combined.While coastal communities have always nurtured the desire to exert sovereignty over 
their own affairs, land, and resources, the rise of the Mombasa Republican Council over the past years has 
imbued the issue with a renewed vibrancy and purpose (Nthambiri,2018).  
 
3.1.5 Deep Rooted Cultural Practices and stereotyping others 
178(51%) respondents strongly agreed, and 132(38%) agreed that deep rooted cultural practices and 
stereotypying were among the reasons why inter-ethnic conflicts continue to be experienced in Kenya.  This 
implies that up to 89 % of Kenyans see it as an issue. These findings agree with Wa Mutua (2017) assertion that 
inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya are largely precipitated by deep rooted cultural practices such as male 
circumcision. 
A Kalenjin Church elder, Sawe (2018) said that the Kalenjins have a deep cultural practice where young men are 
trained to fight and even kill. She explained that young men are cultured to be war-like and whenever an 
opportunity for war arises they are quick to seize it. She elucidated that most of the reasons being given by the 
Kalenjins as the reasons for persistence of conflicts are just triggers. The real issue is that the community is 
ready for war any time. She emphasized that political incitement, land issues and economic dominance just give 
the young men an opportunity to do what they are socialized to. In Laikipia Presbytery, the 13 member FGD 
revealed that the Pokot raid other communities not just for economic gain but the vice is deeply rooted in their 
culture. One respondent claimed that raiding is taken as a sport. This makes inter-ethnic harmony very difficult 
to achieve because some communities engage in battle as part of their normal life. 
 
Other than the cultural aspect, communities living together stereotype each other so negatively that the 
generations that follow take the stereotypes to be factual.  Different communities have a tendency of negative 
perceptions against each other. Ethnic stereotypes in Kenya are a major cause of ethnic tension that has led to 
bloodshed and displacement for many years in the county (TJRC, 2008). The FGDs in all the Presbyteries 
showed that stereotyping is a major reason for the persistence of conflicts in Kenya. In Pwani, Nakuru and 
Eldoret Presbyteries, the Kikuyus are stereotyped by all the other tribes as thieves, opportunists and land 
grabbers, people who love money excessively. This came out in all the FGDs and interviews and was cited as a 
reason as to why conflicts persist in Kenya. On the other hand, the Kikuyus regard the Coastal people and 
Kalenjins as lazy, non-industrious and envious; just waiting for hand outs. According to FGDs carried out in 
Eldoret Presbytery, the Kikuyus stereotype the Kalenjins as war-mongers; people who fight for no apparent 
reason and  are ready for a fight all the time. The FGDs carried out in Laikipia Presbytery revealed that the 
Kikuyu, Maasai and Turkana communities regard the Samburus and the Porkots as cattle rustlers thus making 
the pursuit of inter-ethnic harmony very difficult. As far as these cultural practices and stereotyping are not 
carefully addressed peace and reconciliation remain a nightmare in Kenya.  
 
3.1.6 Language Prejudice and Stereotyping  
The results of this study indicate that 154(44%) strongly agreed and 104(30%) agreed that language prejudice is 
a trigger of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya. This implies that up to 74% of Kenyans see this as factor leading to 
inter-ethnic conflicts. Similar findings were obtained by Sharamo (2014) when he found out that when a group 
insists on using their language in a cosmopolitan set-up, the rest who are not privy to the language feel excluded 
and this may occasion flare-ups. 
 
The 60 respondents who met at Ayub- Kinyua Church in Sirikwa, Eldoret town cited language choices in 
Church, business and general interactions in society as responsible for inter-ethnic conflicts among the various 
groups that lives in Eldoret. The main contention, they said, has been between the speakers of Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin languages. Though they cited other causes of conflicts for instance, the land issues and political 
incitements, they were emphatic of the fact that the insistence of the Kikuyus to use their language in complete 
disregard of others who cannot understand Kikuyu fuels animosity and makes it difficult for the stakeholders to 
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address issues of inter-ethnic conflict.  For example, the use of Kikuyu language in the Churches in total 
disregard of the presence of other communities was cited as a bad thing. The Kalenjins indicated that the 
predominant use of Kikuyu dialect in the Church Service makes them feel left out and makes the case for peace 
difficult.  
 
The FGDs at  Eldoret  revealed that the trend of the Kikuyus, whom the Kajenjins view as intruders, changing 
the names of the indigenous Kalenjin places giving them Kikuyu names make the Kikuyus living in such places 
an easy target.  For example, the Kiambaa PAG Church in Eldoret which was burnt and 35 people had taken 
refuge there killed during the 2007/2008 Post-election violence was targeted for this reason. The Church was 
originally called Lankia in Kalenjin language but the Kikuyus changed it to Kiambaa (Kikuyu language).  Such 
others include PCEA Ayub Kinyua Memorial Church which was originally supposed to be Sirikwa among many 
others. The foregoing has made peace building efforts difficult in many parts of Rift Valley. It was because this 
that as noted by Ruto (2018), during the 2007/08Post-election violence most people took refuge in Catholic and 
African Inland Churches because they had retained the indigenous Kajenjin names.  As such they were spared.  
Notably, this problem is not a recent one. The reaction of the Kalenjins over what they consider the reclaiming of 
their ancestral land is not a new phenomenon, neither does it have its roots in the 1991/1992 ethnic clashes as it 
has been perceived by some people (See Githiga, 2001). As far back as 1969, the Honorable Jean Marie Seroney, 
who was Member of Parliament for Tinderet Constituency had drawn  a controversy when he authored ‘The 
Nandi Declaration’ that demanded all non-Nandi residents vacate the ancestral land  of Nandi. The Kenyatta 
government reacted by imprisoning Seroney for sedition but his ideas did not die. Ironically, in 1991/1992 
President Moi’s government adopted Seroney’s template for ethnic exclusivity.  He expanded to the larger 
Kalenjin community by evicting the  Kikuyus, Luos, Luhyas and Kisiis in his bid to secure political victory in 
the Rift Valley. The truth is that despite public claims of reconciliation, divisions still run deep between 
communities in Rift Valley. As Rev. Maritim Rirei of the Anglican Church of Kenya, Eldoret Diocese puts it 
“The truth is that we are not making headway towards reconciliation (Rirei, 2018). These are issues that we will 
have to wrestle with if at all any meaningful reconciliation will be achieved in Kenya.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The dynamics of the inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya are complex and intricate. While the Government, Church, 
Non-Governmental Organizations and other Peace agencies have made strenuous effort to bring forth Peace, 
Justice and Reconciliation in Kenya, their effort have been thwarted by the continuous persistence of inter-ethnic 
conflicts. The factors leading to this are many as we have discussed in this paper. It is imperative that we look at 
ways of addressing the issues raised including Economic subjugation, Manipulation by the elite, Radicalization, 
Social exclusion and marginalization, outdated cultural practices and language prejudice. Unless well tackled, 
these vices will continue to hamper the effort to bring justice, peace and reconciliation in Kenya. We are not 
saying that all is lost. What we are emphasizing is that all stakeholders must join hands together so that together 
we can build a stable country devoid of endless inter-conflicts which only derail the development of our country. 
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